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My Lawyer Told Me to Say I'm Sorry: Lawyers, Doctors, and Medical
Apologies
Abstract

The role of apologies in litigation has received a great deal of attention in the last ten years. This is particularly
true of “medical apologies,” those expressions of regret and, in some cases, admissions of responsibility made
by health care professionals. Two recent trends have prompted examination of medical apologies. First, widely
reported empirical studies suggest that patients and their families may be less likely to bring malpractice
lawsuits following adverse outcomes if treating physicians have apologized. Second, over about the past ten
years, two-thirds of the states have adopted statutes that exclude these apologies from evidence if there is a
later malpractice trial. Minnesota finds itself in the forefront of one of these trends and at the tail end of the
other. For the last several years, the health care profession has given substantial attention to the importance of
robust physician-patient communication following adverse medical events. Minnesota stands as a leader in
adopting both medical standards and statutory requirements meant to foster disclosure and reporting in the
aftermath of adverse health events. In contrast, Minnesota remains in the minority of states that have not
adopted a statute or rule excluding medical apologies from litigation.
This article argues that Minnesota’s current approach is exactly right. It is a mistake to attempt to use
evidentiary standards to improve physician-patient communication. Our principal objection to these statutes
does not stem from either the nature of doctors or the nature of apologies, but the nature of lawyers. Creating
an evidentiary exclusion for medical apologies would inevitably enmesh lawyers in the most sensitive of
conversations. That would be a mistake. This article reaches its conclusion after examination of the medical
culture surrounding communication between doctor and patient; a review of the evidentiary considerations
that gave rise to these types of statutes and an examination of Minnesota’s own experience with disclosure
following adverse medical events. It is, no doubt, easier to draft evidentiary rules than to change medical
culture, but more profound change will come from focusing on what happens in hospitals rather than what
happens in courtrooms.
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INTRODUCrION

The role of apologies in litigation received a great deal of
attention in the last ten years. This is particularly true of "medical
apologies," those expressions of regret and, in some cases,
admissions of responsibility made by medical professionals. Two
recent trends prompted examination of medical apologies. First,
widely reported empirical studies suggest that patients and their
families may be less likely to bring malpractice lawsuits following
adverse outcomes if treating physicians apologized. Second, over
the past ten years, two-thirds of the states adopted statutes that
exclude these apologies from evidence if there is a later
malpractice trial.
Minnesota finds itself in the forefront of one of these trends
and at the tail end of the other. For the last several years, the
health care profession has given substantial attention to the
importance of robust physician-patient communication following
adverse medical events. Minnesota stands as a leader in adopting
both medical standards and statutory requirements meant to foster
disclosure and reporting in the aftermath of adverse health events.
In contrast, Minnesota remains in the minority of states that have
not adopted a statute or rule excluding medical apologies from
litigation.
This article argues that Minnesota's current approach is
exactly right. In Part IV, this article contends that it is a mistake to
attempt to use evidentiary standards to improve physician-patient
communication. This article is in accord with other commentators
who contend that evidentiary rules are unlikely to have much
impact on health professionals' decisions about appropriate
This article also agrees that
communication with patients.
excluding apologies from later use at trial does, in some sense,
undercut their moral weight. The principal objection to these
statutes, however, does not stem from either the nature of doctors
or the nature of apologies, but the nature of lawyers. Creating an
evidentiary exclusion for medical apologies would inevitably
enmesh lawyers in this kind of doctor-patient communication, and
that would be a mistake. This article reaches its conclusion after a
1.

See, e.g., A~rz. REv. STAT. § 12-2605 (2008); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1160 (2008);
13-25-135 (2008).

COLO. REv. STAT. §
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review of the evidentiary considerations that gave rise to these types
2
of statutes and an examination of Minnesota's own experience
with disclosure following adverse medical events.3 Understanding
the medical culture surrounding communication between doctor
and patient is central to understanding these issues, however. It is
that culture, after all, that gave rise to the perception that a change
in evidentiary rules might help foster better physician-patient
communication. This article begins with an overview of that
culture since it is the context for both the medical and evidentiary
issues relevant to our argument.
II. THE MEDICAL CONTEXT
A.

Breaking the Code of Silence: From Consent to Disclosure to Apology

In 1984, Jay Katz broke the unwritten code of silence in his
book The Silent World of Doctor and Patient, criticizing traditional
medical decision-making in which the physician, relying upon his
or her bestjudgment, acts in the patient's presumed best interest.
The traditional physician typically does so by donning a "mask of
infallibility" and professing certainty as to the best course of
treatment despite the uncertainty that engulfs medical knowledge.4
Instead, Katz advocated for shared decision-making. But to make
shared decision-making work, patient-physician communications
had to be more than a one-way street. As Katz noted, physicians are
well trained to attend to physical needs. Their education, however,
did not extend to caring for patients' decision-making needs.
Katz described a conversation with a surgeon about the
uncertainties that surrounded the treatment (radiation, surgery, or
chemotherapy) of breast cancer at the time. Yet when asked how
the surgeon would speak with a patient about this, the surgeon said
he briefly mentioned a number of possible treatments, but without
indicating that any alternative to radical surgery merited serious
consideration. As Katz relates,
Instead, he had quickly impressed on his patient the need
for submitting to this operation. I commented that he
had given short shrift to other treatment approaches even
though a few minutes earlier he had agreed with me that
2.
3.
4.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
JAY KATz, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 166, 198 (The Free

Press) (1984).
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we still are so ignorant about which treatment is best. He
seemed startled by my comment but responded with little
hesitation that ours had been a theoretical discussion, of
little relevance to practice.
Moreover, he added
emphatically that, in the light of present knowledge,
radical surgery was the best treatment.
While Katz was breaking ground in his description of this
culture of silence, the phenomena itself was far from new. In the
Hippocratic view, physicians should "reveal nothing of the patient's
future or present condition" while attending to patients. Plato's
advice reminded the physician of the duty to "persuade the patient
to accept treatment and to employ 'lies for good and noble
purposes,' if necessary." 6 When the American Medical Association
(AMA) adopted its Code of Ethics in 1847, it described a
physician's "sacred duty" to "avoid all things which have a tendency
to discourage the patient and to depress his spirits."7
Dr. D. W. Cathell expanded upon this approach to patient
relations in his widely-read how-to manual on medical practice for
aspiring physicians, The Physician Himself Consider the following
advice regarding disclosure to the patient:
When called to attend cases of angina pectoris, aneurism,
organic heart disease, desperate wounds or injuries,
apoplexy, and other diseases that create liability to sudden
death, prudence may require you to conceal the danger of
death from the patient, lest he give up all hope and be
overcome by apprehension and terror; but be sure to give,

5. Id. at 167. When the surgeon asked Katz how he would have responded,
Katz replied that he would have clearly explained medicine's ignorance about
which treatment is best and then laid out all treatment options in detail and
discussed them. See id.
Eventually, I would have made a recommendation but only after I had
first elicited her preference and the reasons for her choice. Holding
back for a while on giving her my recommendation would have served

two purposes: one, to prevent her being pressured by my professional
authority to accept my recommendation; and, two, to provide an
additional opportunity to explore... why she had chosen that particular

treatment.
Id.
6. Sheldon F. Kurtz, The Law of Informed Consent: From "Doctor is Right" to
"Patienthas Rights, " 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1243, 1243 (2000).
7. KATZ, supranote 4, at 231.
8. D.W. CATHELL, THE PHYsiciAN HIMSELF 1 (Cushings & Bailey 1882). This

popular manual of personal advice for physicians ran through many editions
between 1881 and its last revision in 1922.
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privately, proper warning to those most interested.9
Or consider this advice regarding an unexpected outcome:
Never exhibit surprise at any possible event growing out of
sickness.
You will be supposed to foreknow all
conceivable things relating to disease, its dangers and its
terminations. Even when death has occurred to some one
under your treatment unexpectedly, do not let your
manner indicate that you were entirely ignorant of its
possibility or that you feel yourself blamable. °
Cathell's advice sought to preserve physician authority and

physician autonomy-with little thought to patient autonomy.
Indeed, despite the many scientific advances and technological
changes within the medical practice, the one-sided "doctor knows
best" physician-patient relationship remained unchanged until late
in the twentieth century." The change began with two cases, Salgo
v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees" and Natanson v.

Kline."
In both cases, the patients were treated with new
technologies without any disclosure of the risks. 14 Both suffered
severe injuries from the treatments. 5 From these facts, the legal
doctrine of "informed consent" was born. 16
9.
10.

Id. at 81.
Id.at 198.

11.

See generally KATZ, supranote 4.

12. 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
13. 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960).
14. In Salgo, the plaintiff was a 55-year-old man who complained of lower leg
pain and abdominal pain. The plaintiff consulted with a surgical specialist who
recommended further testing. Specifically, the specialist recommended that a
procedure called an aortography was needed to determine the extent of the
blockage in plaintiff's aorta. The procedure required the plaintiff to be
anesthetized while a surgeon injected into his aorta sodium urokon, upon which xrays are taken enabling a radiologist to see the blocked areas. After the first x-rays
were viewed, it was determined that additional x-rays were needed. With the
original needle still in place, the surgeon injected an additional amount of sodium
urokon into plaintiff and more x-rays were taken. All physicians involved
considered the procedure to have unfolded normally, and the plaintiff appeared
to be recovering. It was not until the next morning that plaintiff awoke realizing
that his lower extremities were paralyzed: a permanent condition. 317 P.2d at
172-75. In Natanson, the plaintiff was receiving radiation therapy after having a
left mastectomy. The therapy involved injecting plaintiff with radioactive cobalt to
shrink the remaining tumor under her left arm. Plaintiff alleged that the
physician administered the cobalt excessively, such that the skin, flesh, and
muscles beneath her left arm sloughed away and the ribs of her left chest were so
burned that they died. 350 P.2d at 1095-97.
15. Salgo, 317 P.2d at 172-75; Nathanson, 350 P.2d at 1095-97.
16. While the modern doctrine found its roots in these opinions, it took a
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Changing a legal doctrine across time is not the same,
however, as changing physician-patient communication. In his best
seller, Complications, Surgeon Atul Gawande writes of his father's
medical practice in the 1970s and the 1980s when men came to
him seeking vasectomies. It was accepted that his physician father
would judge not only whether surgery was medically appropriate
but also personally appropriate. As Gawande wrote, " [h] e routinely
refused to do the operation if the men were unmarried, married
but without children, or 'too young. ' ' ' 1

Gawande's father was

hardly the exception. Indeed, it took twenty-three years after the
Salgo decision for the AMA to openly acknowledge the concept of
"informed consent" and then it did so only in a short statement by
its Judicial Council that "the patient should make his own
determination on treatment. Informed consent is a basic social
policy ..

,,s

After 1984, some progress was made. Medical schools began to
series of cases to develop the doctrine. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772,
780-81 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In Arato v. Avedon, the court further developed the
informed consent doctrine and said that a physician has a duty to disclose to the
patient all "information which the physician knows or should know [that] would
be regarded as significant by a reasonable person in the patient's position when
deciding whether to accept or reject a recommended medical procedure ......
858 P.2d 598, 607 (Cal. 1993). Eventually, the AMA issued an opinion stating that
informed consent is a byproduct of both the physician and the patient. Informed
consent "is a process of communication between a patient and physician that
results in the patient's authorization or agreement to undergo a specific medical
intervention."
American Medical Association, Informed Consent, available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/legal-topics/patientphysician-relationship-topics/informed-consent.shtml. The AMA lists a number of
items the physician must discuss with the patient; in order for the consent to be
"informed," a patient must have the opportunity to ask questions and obtain a
clear picture of the treatment or procedure. See id.
17. ATUL GAWANDE, COMPLICATIONS: A SURGEON'S NOTES ON AN IMPERFECT
SCIENCE 210 (Picador 2003).
18. Judicial Council of the Am. Med. Ass'n, Current Opinions of the Judicial
Council of the American Medical Association 25 (1981). In his article, Informed
Consent-Must it Remain a Fairy Tale?, 10J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 69, 80-81
(1993),Jay Katz reflects on this AMA statement, noting:
To translate social policy into medical policy is an inordinately difficult
task. It requires a reassessment of the limits of medical knowledge in the
light of medical uncertainty, a reassessment of professional authority to
make decisions for patients in light of the consequences of such conduct
for the well-being of patients, and a reassessment of the limits of patients'
capacities to assume responsibility for choice in the light ,of their
ignorance about medical matters and their anxieties when ill ....
[I]n
the absence of such reassessments, informed consent will remain a
charade, andjoint decision making will elude us.
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address doctor-patient communication as part of its curriculum. 19

More accountability was introduced into the previously cloaked
world of medical self-regulation by adding public members to
actions, and
disciplinary
medical practice boards, increasing
20
. . ...
The National
making more final disciplinary actions public.
Health Practitioners Databank, a clearinghouse for information
about individual physicians that may be accessed by virtually any
entity to which a physician applies for the privilege to practice, was
created by the Heath Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986.21 But
in the closed world of medical practice, the ways to strengthen
physician-patient communication while still publicly addressing
incompetent physicians, were limited. And if physicians struggled
to communicate with patients to share decision making before a
conducting a procedure, how much harder was it to break the code
of silence after a mistake was made? This reality became clear in
1999 when the Institute of Medicine (1OM) published its seminal
22
report on safety, To Err is Human.
The report acknowledged the startling reality that between
44,000 and 98,000 23Americans died each year in hospitals as a result
of medical errors. As the authors point out, even using the lower
figure, the estimated errors in hospitals exceeded the number
24
Even more
attributed to the eighth-leading cause of death.
sobering, the report stated that these numbers represented only a
small portion of the total population at risk as more and more care
19. GAWANDE, supra note 17, at 211-12 (stating that by the time he entered
medical school in the early 1990s, students were taught to see patients as
autonomous decision makers). See generally American Association of Medical
Colleges, Report 1: Learning Objectives for Medical Education: Guidelines for Medical
available at https://services.aamc.org/Publications/
Schools (Jan. 1998),
(follow
index.cfm?fuseaction=Product.displayForm&prd-id=198&prv_id=239
"download now" hyperlink).
20. Marlynn Wei, Doctors, Apologies, and the Law: An Analysis and Critique of
Apology Laws, 40J. HEALTH L. 107, 146-47 (2007).
21. Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660 (1986)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 11101 et seq. (1986)). Hospitals must report actions, such
as suspension or termination, which adversely affect clinical privileges of a
physician for more than thirty days. Id. at § 11133. Medical malpractice payors
must report settlements and judgments and State Medical Boards must report
disciplinary actions. Id. at §§ 11131-11132. One goal of the NHPD is to address
the issue of physician relocation after clinical privileges are limited or revoked. Id.
at § 11101.
22. INST. OF MED., To ERR is HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda
T. Kohn et al. eds., 1999).
23. Id. at 1.
24. Id.
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is provided outside the hospital in outpatient surical centers,
clinics, nursing homes, home care, and other settings.
The IOM report acknowledged that individual human error is
inevitable. It suggested, however, that 90% of the medical errors
were the result of system failures because, if properly designed,
system procedures could better prevent individual human errors.16
But understanding the causes of errors, and to put in place systems
to catch and prevent them, requires discussion of the errors in the
first place. As the executive summary of the report noted:
For the most part,
[S]ilence surrounds this issue.
consumers believe they are protected. Media coverage
has been limited to reporting of anecdotal cases.
Licensure and accreditation confer, in the eyes of the
public, a "Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval." Yet,
licensing and accreditation processes have focused only
limited attention on the issue, and even these minimal
efforts have confronted some resistance from health care
organizations and providers. Providers also perceive the
medical liability systems as a serious impediment to
systematic efforts to uncover and learn from errors. 21
The report harkened back to patient safety expert Lucian
Leape who stated in his seminal article, Errorand Medicine.
[T]he most important reason physicians and nurses have
not developed more effective methods of error prevention
is that they have a great deal of difficulty in dealing with
human error when it does occur. The reasons are to be
found in the culture of medical practice.
Physicians are socialized in medical school and
residency to strive for error-free practice. There is a
powerful emphasis on perfection, both in diagnosis and
treatment. In every day hospital practice, the message is
equally clear: mistakes are unacceptable. Physicians are
expected to function without error, an expectation that
physicians translate into the need to be infallible ....
Role models in medical education reinforce the concept
of infallibility. The young physician's teachers are largely
specialists, experts in their fields, and authorities.
Authorities are not supposed to err. It has been suggested
that this need to be infallible creates a strong pressure to

25.
26.
27.

Id. at 2.
See id. at 3-4.
Id. at 3.
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intellectual dishonesty, to cover up mistakes rather than to
admit them.
The organization of medical practice,
particularly in the hospital, perpetuates these norms.
Errors are rarely admitted or discussed among physicians
in private practice. Physicians typically feel, not without
reason, that admission of error will lead to censure or
increased surveillance or, worse, that their colleagues will
regard them as incompetent or careless. Far better to
conceal a mistake or, if that is impossible, to try and shift
the blame to another, even the patient."
The IOM Report called upon hospitals and other providers to
identify and learn from errors and "near misses," events that could
have resulted in patient injury but were detected in time. 29 The
report galvanized two different, but related, movements pushing
for disclosure. First, patient safety advocates embraced the IOM
Report's recommendations to disclose and report errors so that
they could be systematically tracked and with the aim of addressing
the errors through the system-wide changes. The IOM Report also
propelled the growing movement in the dispute resolution
community towards promoting the role of apology° in resolving civil
disputes, particularly in the health care industry.
B. Progresstoward Disclosureand the Patient Safety Movement
While the "deny and defend" strategy was alive and well at the
turn of this century, both the Joint Commission S31and state
governments heeded the IOM's call for increased disclosure. The

28.

Lucian L. Leape, Errorin Medicine, 272JAMA 1851 (1994).
See INST. OF MED., supra note 22, at 177.
See e.g., Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV.
1009 (1999); Aviva Orenstein, Apology Accepted: Incorporatinga Feminist Analysis Into
Evidence Policy Where You Would Least Expect It, 28 SW. U. L. REv. 221 (1999).
31. Why the reluctance by the medical profession to disclose errors and
apologize? The answers are complex and the subject of many commentaries, but
Lucian Leape summarized them well when he wrote:
*
Admitting fault and apologizing is often very difficult for the
caregiver. Medical injury, particularly if it is serious, is very
different from other types of situations where people apologize,
because it is a physical injury, albeit unintended.
*
The consequences for patient and doctor can be substantial:
the patient may die or suffer a lifelong disability.
" For the physician, in addition to provoking feelings of shame
and guilt, the incident raises concerns about his or her
reputation, and the possibility of a malpractice suit. The more
profound the consequences, the more difficult it is to accept
29.
30.
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Joint Commission, which accredits hospitals and other health care
institutions, issued a Sentinel Event Policy in 1996.2 This policy
required accredited institutions to investigate adverse events and
implement measures to prevent the event from happening in the
future.
But in 2001, the Joint Commission went further: it
required accredited hospitals to tell patients of "unanticipated"
34
outcomes.
The IOM report also recommended the establishment of a
nationwide mandatory reporting system in which state governments
would collect information about patient errors resulting in death
or serious harm. 3 5 Minnesota was the first state to adopt mandatory
disclosure of "never events" in 2003.
Other states followed suit
and by January 2007, twenty-six states required the report of an
adverse event or incident. 31 Pennsylvania became the first state to
require hospitals to notify not only the state, but patients of a
serious event resulting from a medical error. 31
responsibility and apologize.
The natural reluctance to "fess up as long been legitimized by
lawyers and risk managers who have advised physicians not to
admit responsibility or apologize-advice that is still given in
many institutions.
Leape, supra note 28. We suggest an additional reason: in medicine, without
disclosure by the provider, a serious error may go undetected by the patient.
When a car runs a four way stop and crashes into your automobile, you have a
pretty fair idea that an accident occurred and who caused it. If you are a patient
in the hospital and have an unexpected medical outcome, you most likely will not
know whether your condition was the result of medical error, or simply an
unexpected turn in the illness that hospitalized you in the first place. The
information gap between providers and patients is one of the reasons we view
physicians as fiduciaries. But that information gap can also cloak mistakes, which
makes acceptance of responsibility even more difficult.
32. JoINT
COMM'N,
SETnNG
THE
STANDARD,
available
at
www.jointcommission.org/NR/rdonlyres/6C33FEDB-BB50-4CEE-950B-A6246DA
4911 E/)/setting-the-standard.pdf.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. INST. OF MED., supranote 22, at 9.
36. Am. Med. News, Minnesota Report Card on Patient Safety, available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2006/03/27/prcaO327.htm.
37. June M. Sullivan & Renee H. Martin, PatientSafety Handbook, 41, 41 (ABA
*

2008).
38. See http://patientsafetyauthority.org/PA-PSRS/Pages/PAPSRS.aspx. The
Pennsylvania statute defines a "serious event" as "[a]n event, occurrence or
situation involving the clinical care of a patient in a medical facility that results in
death or compromises patient safety and results in an unanticipated injury
requiring the delivery of additional health care services to the patient." 40 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 1303.302 (2006). See also Patient Safety Authority, Reporting Medical
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The federal regulatory response was slower, but Congress
enacted the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act (PSQIA)
in 2005. Rules implementing the Act went into effect January 19,
2009. 39 The PSQIA creates a voluntary system for reporting and
aggregating patient safety information through newly created
Patient Safety Organizations. In a more direct approach, Medicare
and Medicaid announced in 2008 that they will not pay for certain
"never events," such as wrong-site surgery, pressure ulcers, or
foreign bodies left in a patient after surgery.
In addition to payment consequences from CMS and
disclosure directives from the Joint Commission and many states,
the AMA issued a new opinion addressing disclosure from the
perspective of physician ethics. In December 2003, the AMA's
Council in Ethical and Judicial Affairs Opinion 8.121 advised
physicians that it was their ethical responsibility to study and
prevent error and harm. Physicians, according to the opinion,
should help establish and then "participate fully" S in41 effective,
confidential, and protected error-reporting mechanisms. Further,
the opinion directs physicians to
Offer professional and compassionate concern toward
patients who have been harmed, regardless of whether the
harm was caused by a healthcare error. An expression of
concern need not be an admission of responsibility.
When patient harm has been caused by an error,
physicians should offer a general explanation regarding
the nature of the error and the measures being taken to
Such
prevent similar occurrences in the future.
communication is fundamental to the trust that
underlines the patient-physician relationship, and may
help reduce the risk of liability.4 2
Errors, availableat http://www.psa.state.pa.us/psa/cwp/
view.asp?a=1147&q=440863&psaNav=I.
39. Patient Safety Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-21.
40. See, e.g., Press Release, CMS Proposes Three National Coverage
Determinations to Protect Patients from Preventable Surgical Errors (Dec. 2,
2008), availableat http://www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/media/press/
release.asp?Counter=3375&intNumPerPage=10; Kevin Sack, Medicare Rules Say "Do
No Harm," N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 1, 2008, at Al.
41. AMA Council in Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Opinion 8.121 (discussing
the ethical responsibility to study and prevent harm and error).
42. Id. This Opinion updated the 1994 Opinion 8.121 and provides further
ethical guidance, stating in part: "Situations occasionally occur in which a patient
suffers significant medical complications that may have resulted from the
physician's mistake or judgment. In these situations, the physician is ethically
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C. The Academic Case for Apologies in Health CareDisputes
Taking note of studies that found one major reason patients
sued their doctors was physicians' failure to be forthright about
mistakes and apologize for them, 43 dispute resolution scholars
began encouraging the use of apologies. One of the early studies
that motivated scholars was published in Lancet in 1994. The
researchers surveyed 227 patients and their families who filed legal
claims following an adverse medical outcome. 4 The study found
that patients took legal action not just because of the injury, but
because of the insensitivity of physicians after the accident. 46 More
importantly, patients and their families did not want similar
mistakes to happen to anyone else. Patients and their families
wanted an explanation. They wanted the physician to understand
how they felt. And they wanted compensation. 47
As Jonathan Cohen notes in his entertaining article that
features a "debate" about laws excluding expressions of sympathy
and benevolence between two law school friends, determining how
many plaintiffs really would have
away upon receipt of a
•
•walked
48
heartfelt apology is next to impossible. One of the debaters, Flo,
remarks:
It is impossible to know with perfect certainty what
required to inform the patient of all the facts necessary to ensure understanding
of what has occurred." Id.
43. See, e.g., Gerald B. Hickson et al., Factors that Prompted Families to File
Medical Malpractice Claims Following Perinatal Injuries, 267 JAMA 1359 (1992);
Charles Vincent et al., Why Do People Sue Doctors? A Study of Patients and Relatives
Taking LegalAction, 343 LANCET 1609, 1612 (1994); Amy B. Witman et al., HowDo
Patients Want Physicians to Handle Mistakes, 156 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 2565,
2568 (1996) (stating that in cases of moderate physician error, only 12% would
sue if informed of error, but 20% would do so if later learned of error).
44. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 30; Ann J. Kellett, Comment, Healing Angry
Wounds: The Roles of Apology and Mediation in Disputes between Physicians and Patients,
1987 Mo. J. DisP. RESOL. 111, 126-27 (stating the importance of an apology in
managing physician-patient disputes); Orenstein, supra note 30; Peter H. Rehm &
Denise R. Beatty, Legal Consequences of Apologizing, 1996 J. DIsp. REsOL. 115, 129
(1996).
45. Vincent, supra note 43.
46. Id. at 1611.
47. Vincent, supra note 43, at 1611. See, e.g., Hickson, supra note 43. Marlynn
Wei points out, however, that there has been no "clear empirical study" of the
impact of full disclosure on a patient's desire to sue. Doctors, Apologies, and the Law,
40J. HEALTH L. 107, 142 (2007). Wei writes that "disclosure has been shown to
increase, decrease, or not change at all the patient's desire to sue." Id.
48. Jonathan R. Cohen, Legislating Apology: The Pros and Cons, 70 U. CIN. L.
REV. 819, 844 (2002).
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fraction of patients would not have sued if they had
received an apology. Some skepticism is warranted.
When a patient says that he would not have sued if he had
received an apology, you can never know for sure what he
would have done if he had. But surely some patients can
I can't say for sure whether
be taken at their word ....
the percentage of patients who would have forgone suit if
they had received an apology is 5%, 15%, 25% or perhaps
even 35%. But if the percentage is even half of what these
studies suggest, it is a sizable percentage.49
Other scholars, relying on both their personal mediation
experiences, as well as empirical research, agree. 5 Advocates of
apology and disclosure include medical practitioners and ethicists,
who focused on their use not simply as a risk-management tool, but
as a way to improve the physician-patient relationship and, in doing
so, achieve better patient outcomes.51
D. EmpiricalResearch on Disclosure and Apology
As scholars and medical practitioners wrote of the importance
of medical apologies, researchers began to study in more detail
how apologies affect dispute resolution and the prevalence of
physician disclosure and apology after medical error. Professor
Jennifer Robbennolt conducted empirical research on the role of
apology in settlement that was published in 2003. 5 ' Her study
participants read an accident scenario, were assigned the role of
victim and evaluated a settlement offer from the other
accident
53
Some offers included "full" apologies-those with54
party.
expression of sympathy and an acknowledgment of responsibility.
Others included a "partial apology"- an offer of sympathy and
hope for a quick recovery, but the other party did not accept
49.

Id.

50. See supra note 434 and accompanying text.
51. This article primarily addresses the work of legal scholars, but certainly To
Error is Human sparked great interest by providers on the role of apologies. See
generally NAN(Y

BERLINGER, AFTER HARM:

MEDICAL ERROR AND THE ETHICS OF

FORGIVENESS I (Johns Hopkins U. Press 2005); MICHAEL S. WOODS, HEALING
WORDS: THE POWER OF APOLOGY IN MEDICINE I (2d ed. 2007); Doug Wojcieszak et

al., The Sory Works! Coalition:Making the Casefor FullDisclosure,32 Joint Commission
J. on Quality & Patient Safety 344-50 (June 2006).
52. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical
Examination, 102 MICH. L. REv. 460 (2003).
53. Id. at 484.
54.

Id. at 484-85.
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56
responsibility. 55 Others included no apology at all.

Her research showed that while 52% of respondents said they
would probably accept the settlement offer with no offered
apology, 73% were inclined to accept the offer with a "full"
apology. 57 As she described her findings,

Apologies, particularly those that accepted responsibility
for having caused injury, favorably influenced a variety of
attributions made about the situation and the other party,
including perceptions of the character of and the degree
of regret experienced by the other party, expectations
about the way in which the other party would behave in
the future, and expectations about the relationship
between the parties going forward. Similarly, apologies
influenced the emotions that participants reported they
would feel-decreasing anger toward the other party and
increasing sympathy for the other's position.
Full,
responsibility-accepting apologies showed these effects
consistently. Apologies that merely expressed sympathy
were more context dependent, favorably influencing these
attributions under some circumstances, but not in
others. 8
In a follow up study, Robbennolt used the same scenario to
assess the effects of apologies on attorneys. 59 The basic fact pattern
varied with regard to the type of apology given, the evidentiary rule
governing apology admissibility, and strength of the plaintiffs
case.60 Robbennolt concluded that both the type of apology (full
versus partial) and the type of evidentiary rule influenced
attorneys' views of the apology." Like claimants, attorneys had a
more positive assessment of a full apology, as opposed to a partial
apology or no apology at all. 6 Attorney assessment of the apology
was also influenced by whether it was "protected" by an evidentiary
rule excluding the apology from evidence at trial. Claimants and
attorney opinion diverged when it came to assessing settlement in
light of effective apologies.
While claimants became more
55.

Id. at 485.

56.
57.

Id. at 484.
Id. at 485-86.

58. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Attorneys, Apologies, and Settlement Negotiation, 13
HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 349, 362 (Spring 2008) (citations omitted).
59. Id. at 350.
60. Id.
61.
Id. at 351.
62. Id. at 372.
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amenable to settlement, attorneys developed higher settlement
expectations-and expected more money-post-apology. 6 As a
result, Robbennolt notes, the involvement of attorneys in legal
disputes "has the potential to change the dynamics of negotiations
involving apologies." 64
Of course, "full" apologies assume disclosure of a mistake.
While Professor Robbennolt studied claimant and lawyer responses
to apologies, other scholars addressed the more fundamental
problem of whether unanticipated outcomes in medicine were
being disclosed to begin with. Most of these studies track recent
behavior, given that the disclosure push (driven by the Joint
Commission and state and federal laws) largely occurred after the
publication of To Err is Human.
The overall results of the studies are cause for concern. In
2005, the Joint Commission reports that "few caregivers and health
care organizations voluntarily break through the wall of silence to
report life-threatening medical errors beyond the walls of their
institutions." 65 A 2004 report found that half of the hospitals
surveyed were reluctant to comply with the Joint Commission's new
accreditation standards (that require the disclosure of certain
unanticipated outcomes to patients) because of fear of medical
malpractice lawsuits.66 A study of physicians-in-training found that
67
only 24% discussed mistakes with the patient or patient's family.
In a study of physicians who disclosed obvious errors, the surgeons
described what happened to patients using the words "error" or
"mistake" in 57% of cases, the word "complication" or "problem"
in 27% of cases and did not suggest "error" at all in 16% of cases.68
Yet another nationwide study suggests that physicians disclose

63. Id. at 374.
64. Id. at 383.
65. Joint Commission, Health Care at the Crossroads: Strategies for Improving the
Medical Liability System and Improving Patient Safety 1, 28 (2005), available at
http://www.jointcommission.org/NR/
rdonlyres/167DD821-A395-48FD-87F9-6AB12BCACBOF/0/MedicalLiability.pdf.
66. Kelly J. Devers et al., Wat Is Driving Hospitals' Patient-Safety Efforts?, 23
HEALTH AFF. 103, 111-12 (Mar.-Apr. 2004), available at http://www.healthaffairs.

org/RWJ/Devers.pdf.
67. Albert W. Wu et al., Do House Officers Learnfrom their Mistakes?, 12 QUALITY
&
SAFETY
IN
HEALTH
CARE
221,
224
(2003),
available at
http://vw.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/picrender.fcgi?artid=1743709&blobtype=pdf.
68. David K. Chan, How Surgeons Disclose Medical Errorsto Patients:A Study Using
StandardizedPatients, 138 SURGERY 851, 854-55 (2005).

HeinOnline -- 35 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1424 2008-2009

2009]

MY LAWYER TOLD ME TO SAY I'M SORRY

1425

errors in only about 30% of cases. 69 In summary, while scholars,
ethicists, and some practitioners were researching and advocating
for medical apologies, disclosure of the underlying errors was far
from routine.
II.

A.

EVIDENTIARY CONSIDERATIONS

The Backdrop of the Rules

The rules of evidence divide the universe of apologies into two
categories. If an apology is a statement made during "compromise
negotiations," then, as a general rule, it will be excluded from
However, there cannot be negotiations about a
evidence. 7'
69. Robert J. Blendon et al., Views of PracticingPhysicians and the Public on
MedicalErrors, 347 N. ENGL.J. MED. 1933, 1935 (2002) (stating only about one third
of physicians and patients responding to a survey reported that, after experiencing
a medical error, physicians involved either discussed it with the patient or
In response to the common wisdom that physicians were the
apologized).
"reluctant partners" (confirmed in large part by the studies described above) in
reporting errors to hospitals where they practice, a Health Affairs study published
in late 2008 sought to learn about physician attitudes. Jane Garbutt et al., Lost
Opportunities:How Physicians Communicate About Medical Errors,27 HEALTH AFF. 246
Most of the over one thousand physicians surveyed reported prior
(2008).
involvement with a serious error. The majority also agreed that to improve patient
safety, errors should be reported, but few believed that they had access to a
reporting system that was designed to improve patient safety. Only 30% agreed
that current systems for physicians to report patient safety problems to their
hospital or health organization were adequate.
70. Even before issuance of the IOM report, To Err Is Human, a few
institutions began moving disclosure and apology from the pages of scholarship
into reality. An early example was the VA Hospital in Lexington, Kentucky.
Troubled by two large malpractice verdicts, the VA adopted a system in 1987 that
sought out the patient and family after an adverse event. After informing the
patient that an error occurred, and if the VA's risk management committee
determined that the hospital was at fault, the family would receive an apology, in
person and in writing, and a fair settlement would be offered. Jonathan R. Cohen,
Apology and Organizations: Exploring an Example from Medical Practice, 27 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1447, 1448-51 (2000). The VA went so far as to post excerpts of its policy
at hospital entrances. Id. at n.9. Shifting to this policy of "extreme honesty"
resulted in lower costs in claims paid out. Other notable institutions which have
formal policies in place include Children's Hospital in Minneapolis, Johns
Hopkins, Catholic Healthcare West, and the University of Michigan Health
System. See e.g., MICHAEL S. WOODS, HEALING WORDS: THE POWER OF APOLOGY IN
MEDICINE (2nd ed. 2007) (describing the VA and University of Michigan
Programs); Ellen L. Barton & Mark A. Kadzielski, Tell Me Now and Tell Me Later:
Disclosure and Reporting of Medical Errors, AHLA Seminar Materials, 56-57 (2007)
(describing the Children's, Johns Hopkins, and Catholic Healthcare West
programs).
71. The "general rule" of evidence in question is Rule 408. Minnesota Rule
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compromise until there is a "genuine dispute" about the validity or
amount of a claim." A genuine dispute triggers setting and timing
problems that give rise to the perceived need for a special rule or
statute excluding evidence of medical apologies. If a medical
apology is made in the setting of settlement negotiations about a
genuine dispute, then evidence of the apology cannot be offered at
a later trial of the dispute, should those negotiations prove
unsuccessful. On the other hand, if the apology is made before the
existence of a genuine dispute, or if the apology is made after the
dispute exists but outside the context of compromise negotiations,
then it is highly likely evidence of the apology will be admissible at
a later trial.
The apology will likely be admissible because, like other states
with evidentiary rules based on the federal model, Minnesota
permits virtually unchecked admission of an opponent party's
statements.73 The applicable Minnesota evidentiary rule provides,
in pertinent part, that statements of a party are not hearsay if:
The statement is offered against a party and is (A) the
party's own statement, in either an individual or a
representative capacity, or.. . (C) a statement by a person
authorized by the party to make a statement concerning
the subject, or (D) a statement by the party's agent or
servant concerning a matter within the scope of the
agency or employment, made during the existence of the
relationship ....
Unlike other evidence proffered at trial, the statements of the
opposing party can typically be admitted without any evidence that
the opposing party had the personal knowledge necessary to form
foundation for the statement. 75 As the Committee Comment to
of Evidence 408, like its federal progenitor and counterparts in other states,
creates a broad prohibition on the admission of evidence of statements or conduct
that occurs during settlement negotiations. Minnesota Rule of Evidence 408 also
excludes from evidence at trial the existence of an agreement for corrective action
(ACA). See In re Buckmaster, 755 N.W.2d 570, 580 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008). In that
case, the court held that an ACA could not be used as evidence of liability or
impeachment purposes. Id. at 581.
72. See, e.g., MINN. R. EvD. 408, committee's cmt. (1977).
73. See generally MINN. R. EVID. 801(d) (2) (2006).
74. Id.
The omitted portions of Rule 801(d)(2) relate to adoptive
admissions-statements of a party that are made through either express or implied
agreement with the statement of another and statements made by a co-conspirator
of a party.
75. Minnesota Rule of Evidence 602 provides, in pertinent part, that a
"witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to
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Rule 801 (d) (2) explains:
The rule excludes party admissions from its definition of
hearsay. The requirements of trustworthiness, firsthand
knowledge, or rules against opinion which may be
applicable in determining whether or not a hearsay
statement should be admissible do not apply when dealing
with party admissions. Because the rationale for their
admissibility is based more on the nature of the adversary
it
or necessity,
system than in principles of trustworthiness
76
as nonhearsay.
makes sense to treat party admissions
In short, a statement made by the opposing party is freely
admissible, even if the person making the statement did not have
77
sufficient personal knowledge to support the statement.
As a practical matter, Rule 801 (d) (2) means that so long as a
statement is relevant for some purpose, any statement made
following an accident, injury, or adverse medical outcome is
support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter." As the
Committee Comment indicates, this rule articulates a "fundamental principle of
evidence law." This fundamental principle is generally applicable to hearsay
statements other than statements of a party-opponent:
With the exception of party admissions, which are admitted as a function
of the adversary system (and are not hearsay under rule 801(d) (2)) the
Courts have generally required that the declarant of a hearsay statement
have firsthand knowledge, before the hearsay statement is admissible.
The rule should be read to continue this practice.
MINN. R. EVID. 602, committee's cmt. (1977).

76. MINN. R. EvD. 801 (d) (2), committee's cmt. (1989).
77. The Minnesota Supreme Court muddied the otherwise clear waters of this
rule of law in Kelly v. Ellefson, 712 N.W.2d 759 (Minn. 2006). The case did not
involve a claim of professional malpractice, but instead arose out of lawsuits filed
following a motor vehicle accident allegedly occurring, in part, due to a violation
of the state's Dram Shop Act. Id. at 761-65. The plaintiff in Kelly entered a
Pierringersettlement with two defendants shortly before trial. Id. at 761. During
trial, one of the nonsettling defendants sought to prove the fault of a settling

defendant by attempting to introduce three different pieces of evidence, all of
which seemed to be statements of one of the parties-opponent. Id. at 761-66. The
most significant, for purposes here, was the plaintiff's interrogatory answers
concerning the basis for the alleged fault of the settling defendants, and third, the
plaintiff's supplemental interrogatory answer outlining the testimony of an expert
toxicologist who ultimately did not testify at trial. With respect to those answers,
the Minnesota Supreme Court held that, because the plaintiff had no personal
knowledge of the facts asserted in the interrogatory answers, those answers were
inadmissible. Id. at 769. In the course of its decision, the supreme court took note
of the language of the Committee Comment cited above, supra note 75, but
nonetheless ruled that since the statements contained in the interrogatory answers
would not have been admissible had the plaintiff attempted to testify to those
matters at trial, it was not error for the district court to exclude use of those
answers at trial. Id. at 769.
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admissible. Automobile insurance companies have long been
aware of this and recognized that in the heat of emotion following
a car accident, policy holders may feel inclined to apologize even
though they are not legally at fault. As a consequence, it is not
unusual for insurance companies to give policyholders "what to do
in the case of an accident" instructions that include warnings not to
apologize or talk about fault."
Doctors have long behaved as if they were carrying cards in
their pockets bearing much the same message. As set forth above,
doctors and other health-care professionals traditionally practiced
in the context of a culture of silence. Lawyers themselves are
skeptical of post-event apologies, expressions of sympathy, or any
other statements that could be construed as admissions of fault for
the event in question. The free admission at trial of the statements
made by doctors, nurses, or other hospital personnel following an
adverse event-regardless of whether those individuals have
sufficient bases of knowledge for making those statements-may
alone be reason for a lawyer to counsel steadfast silence.
A lawyer may well have other legitimate reasons for advising
limited communication with patients or their families following
adverse medical outcomes. First, statements that imply someone
did something wrong could prompt a patient to take the first steps
down the road to filing a malpractice action. Second, a statement
about the cause of an unwelcome or unforeseen outcome will
become useful fodder during discovery, regardless of whether those
statements are themselves admissible at trial. All of this may help
explain why lawyers have traditionally been wary of apologies in the
midst of litigation.7 9

78. See, e.g., What To Do In Case Of An Accident, http://www.certifiedfirst.
com/accident/ ("Exchange insurance company information. DO NOT discuss
'fault' or make statements about the accident to anyone but the police."); Auto
Insurance: What To Do In Case Of An Accident, http://www.autorisk.com/auto/
whatTOdoACCIDENT.htm ("Be careful of what you say. Don't talk about fault;
even casual remarks can be used in court."). Several state bar associations offer
similar advice on their public websites. See, e.g., Auto Accident: What Should I Do If I
Have an Auto Accident ?, http://www.calbar.ca.gov/state/calbar/
calbarextend.jsp?cid=10581 &id=2174:
Do not volunteer any information about who was to blame for the
accident. You may think you are in the wrong and then learn that the
other driver is as much or more to blame than you are. You should first
talk to your insurance agent, your lawyer or both. Anything you say to
the police or the other driver can be used against you later.
79. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 30, at 1010.
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B. Statutory Development of Exclusions
An early advocate for the potential benefits of apology in
resolving disputes, Jonathan Cohen, urges lawyers to discuss the
possibility of apology with clients.

In Advising Clients to Apologize,

Cohen defines the term "apology" to include three elements: 1)
admitting one's fault; 2) expressing regret for the injurious action;
and 3) expressing sympathy for the other's injury.'s He surveys the
benefits of apology; benefits that include permitting serious
settlement negotiations, but also benefits of repairing relationships,
offering psychological growth, and preventing antagonistic
behavior (including litigation),." Weighed against these benefits
are concerns that an apology may be perceived as a sign of
weakness and as evidence of liability, concerns that historically led
attorneys to advise clients to "defend and deny" rather than accept
82
responsibility and apologize.
Acknowledging that attorney warnings regarding apologies are
not without basis, Cohen then discusses why lawyers do not
recommend apologies.1s While some of the purported reasons
stem from ignorance (do not think of it/unaware that there are
relatively "safe" ways to apologize, such as in mediation), more of
the reasons reflect the role lawyers play in society. 4 Clients expect
their lawyers to fight for them. Cohen quotes a client, "if I wanted
someone to tell me to apologize, I would have gone to my minister,
not my lawyer.,15 According to Cohen, these client expectations
are driven by many "macho" lawyers who see their role as fighters
and, correspondingly, who do not want to appear "disloyal" by
raising the subject of apology with clients.8 6 To address these
tensions, Cohen advocates the creation of an evidentiary exclusion
for apologies and puts forward three possibilities for exclusion: any
apology which occurred within a certain, brief period after the
injury; any "sincere" apology; or an apology of any sort.87
80. Id. at 1014-15. The other early advocate for excluding apologies from
admissibility was raised by Aviva Orenstein. See Orenstein, supra note 30, at 223.
81. Cohen, supra note 30, at 1019-23.
82. Id. at 1023-30.
83. Id. at 1030-31.
84. See generally id. at 1031.
85. Id. at 1043.
86. Id. at 1043-44. Cohen also lists "loss aversion" and "divergent interests"
stemming from the fact that apologies help bring disputes-from which lawyers
derive income-to an end. Id. at 1046.
87. Id. at 1062-63. Cohen notes that "there is a certain irony under the
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As scholars commented and physicians and patient-safety
advocates weighed in on the value of apologies, state legislatures
joined the debate. Massachusetts was the first state to enact
legislation designed to protect wrongdoers who apologize and show
remorse for their actions by excluding expressions of sympathy. 88
The impetus for the bill did not arise in a health-care setting.
Rather, it came from a Massachusetts legislator whose daughter was
struck by a car while riding her bicycle. The driver of the car did
not apologize, and the state senator was told that the reason for this
was because the apology might have constituted an admission in a
litigation surrounding the girl's death. 9° In response, the senator
drafted a bill to protect wrongdoers who apologize. 9'
The
Massachusetts statute provides as follows:
Statements, writings or benevolent gestures expressing
sympathy or a general sense of benevolence relating to
the pain, suffering or death of a person involved in an
accident and made to such person or to the family of such
person should be inadmissible as evidence of an
admission of liability in a civil action. 92
For many years, Massachusetts stood alone. Particularly after
the issuance of To Err is Human, however, other states began to
follow suit. In 1999, Texas passed a law that protects statements of
regret and statements of sympathy, but not statements "concerning
negligence or culpable conduct."93 In 2003, Colorado and Oregon
enacted statutes that
S 94specifically protect expressions of sympathy in
health-care settings.
The Colorado law not only creates an
evidentiary privilege for health-care provider statements of
remorse, but also for certain statements of fault. It applies only to
"an unanticipated outcome of medical care" and gives protection

current Federal Rules, which through specific evidentiary exclusions for
subsequent remedial measures and payment of medical and similar expenses,
encourage offenders to take steps toward physical repair following an injury but
discourage the often more fundamental relational and psychological repair
potentially afforded, and only afforded, by an apology. Id.
88. MAss. GEN. LAwS ANN. ch. 233, § 23 D.
89. Cohen, supra note 48, at 827 (quoting Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The
Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135, 1151 (2000)).
90.
91.

Id.
Id. at827.

92.

MASS.

93.
94.

TEX. Civ. PRAC.& REM. CODE ANN. § 18.061(c) (Vernon 2001).
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-135 (2003); Or. Rev. Stat. § 677.082 (2003).

GEN.

LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 23D (2008).
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95
to statements accepting fault and anticipated outcome.
In summary, since the passage of the initial Massachusetts
Apology Legislation, more that thirty-five states passed legislation to
amend the rules of evidence to make inadmissible some form of
apology.9 6 A number of these statutes differ, much as the original
Massachusetts, Texas, and Colorado bills protect different types of
statements.
Indeed, minor variations in the wording of the
different state laws make a demonstrable difference in what
evidence is admissible and, accordingly, what advice an attorney
would provide a physician on how to craft an apology. Consider
the examples set out below:
Washington: Admissibility of Sympathetic Gestures
The portion of statements, writings, or benevolent
gestures expressing sympathy or a general sense of
benevolence relating to the pain, suffering, or death of a
person involved in an accident, and made to that person
or to the family of that person, shall be inadmissible as
evidence in a civil action. A statement of fault, however,
which is part of, or in addition to, any of the above shall
not be made inadmissible by this section.97
Arizona: Evidence of Admissions; Civil Proceedings;
Unanticipated Outcomes; Medical Care
In any civil action that is brought against a health care
provider... any statement, affirmation, gesture or
conduct expressing apology, responsibility, liability,
sympathy, commiseration, condolence, compassion or a
general sense of benevolence that was made by a health
care provider or an employee of a health care provider to
the patient, a relative of the patient.., and relates to the
discomfort, pain, suffering, injury or death of the patient
as the result of an unanticipated outcome of medical care
is inadmissible as evidence of an admission
••
98 of liability or
as evidence of an admission against interest.

Vermont: Expression of Regret or Apology by Health Care
Provider Inadmissible
95.

COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-135 (2)(d).

96. See Robbennolt, supranote 58.
97. WASH. REv. CODE § 5.66.010 (2008). The statute defines "accident" as "an
occurrence resulting in injury or death to one or more persons that is not the
result of willful action by a party." "Benevolent gestures" means actions "that
convey a sense of compassion or commiseration emanating from humane
impulses." Id.
98.

ARIz. REv. STAT.

ANN.

§ 12-2605 (2005).
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An oral expression of regret or apology, including any
oral good faith explanation of how a medical error
occurred, made by or on behalf of a health care provider
or health care facility, that is provided within 30 days of
when the provider or facility knew or should have known
of the consequences of the error, does not constitute a
legal admission of liability for any purpose .... 99
Consider just a few issues raised by these "apology laws." In
Vermont, an oral expression of regret for a medical error
documented in the medical record, which calls for documentation
of patient communication, raises an admissibility question for the
medical record. The issue of how a judge determines whether an
explanation is made in "good faith" is not addressed in the statute.
In Arizona, a physician may wonder whether he can be deposed
about a patient conversation, even if the conversation itself is
inadmissible.' °° Consider the Washington physician who tells a
patient: "I'm sorry about your reaction to the medication I
prescribed. I wish I had prescribed a different one." Is this a
statement "of fault" made here so that the conversation is
admissible--or would only part of the conversation that implies
fault be admissible? Finally, none of these laws explicitly preclude
the use of the apology for impeachment purposes at trial.
All of the ambiguities addressed above have one thing in
common: they will drive health-care providers to call their lawyers.
III. MINNESOTA'S EXPERIENCE
As set forth in the preceding section, different states
wide varieties of evidentiary exclusions protecting
apologies. An account of Minnesota's own experience
dimensions: one evidentiary and one medical; one quite
and one more nuanced.
A.

adopted
medical
has two
succinct

Minnesota'sExperience: The EvidentiayDimension

Minnesota does not have either a rule-based or statutory
exclusion for medical apologies. With the exception of apologies
made in the context of compromise negotiations, medical

99. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1912 (2005).
100. In Oregon, a licensed physician who makes an expression "of regret or
apology" may not be examined by deposition with respect to an expression of
regret or apology. OR. REv. STAT. § 677.082 (2003).
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apologies are freely admissible at trial in Minnesota. In short,
doctors and health-care professionals in Minnesota conduct their
medical practice and communication with patients subject to the
civil equivalent of a portion of the Miranda warning: anything you
say can and will be used against you in a court of law.
B. Minnesota'sExperience: The Medical Dimension
The medical dimension of Minnesota's experience with
medical apologies is considerably more complex. Central to that
experience is Minnesota's adverse reporting requirement. An
understanding of Minnesota's experience must begin, however,
with an overview of the medical malpractice climate in Minnesota
relative to the rest of the country.
Medical apologies raise
important issues of patient care and communication that, in turn,
touch upon concerns having to do with the responsible and ethical
practice of medicine. Much of the recent attention to medical
apologies, however, springs from the impact apologies have on
malpractice claims.
1.

Malpracticein Minnesota

The Robert Woods Johnson Foundation defines a medical
malpractice crisis as "a period of volatility in the malpractice
insurance market characterized by above-average increases in
premiums, contractions in the supply of insurance and
01
deterioration in the financial health of insurance carriers."'
Currently, the AMA recognizes twenty-two states as being in a state
of medical liability crisis; Minnesota is not among them.
The
following discussion of medical malpractice insurance premiums,
claim rates, and payment rates in Minnesota as compared with the
rest of the nation illustrates that the medical malpractice situation
in Minnesota is relatively stable.

101.
CLAUDIA H. WILLIAMS & MICHELLE M. MELLO, ROBERT WOODS JOHNSON
FOUND., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THE IMPACT OF THE CRISIS AND THE EFFECT OF STATE
TORT REFORMS 1 (2006), available at http://www.rwjf.org/pr/product.jsp?id=

15168 (follow download hyperlink).
102. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,

MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM-Now! A
COMPENDIUM OF FACTS SUPPORTING MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM AND DEBUNKING
ARGUMENTS
AGAINST
REFORM 8
(2008), available at http://www. ama-

assn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/-1/mlrnow.pdf.
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InsurancePremiums

Minnesota's malpractice premiums are among the lowest in
the country.0 3 Data from the most recent Medical Liability
Monitor Rate Survey indicates that Minnesota has the lowest rates
of insurance premiums in three major areas: internists, general
(OB-GYN) -104
gynecology
and
obstetrics
and
surgeons,
Furthermore, the rates for internists and general surgeons held
steady between 2007 and 2008.115 On the other end of the
spectrum, the Miami-Dade region of Florida had the highest rates
of insurance premiums in each of the three categories.'O6 On a
positive note, the Florida rates decreased from 2007 to 2008,
indicating a softening of the market and perhaps a foreseeable
stabilization of the medical liability climate.' °7 Figure 1.1 compares
the rates of Minnesota and Florida. Notice that the general surgery
rate in Florida in 2008 is nineteen times the rate in Minnesota for
the same year.
Figure

Florida

Minnesota
2007

2008

Change

2007

2008

Change

Internist

$3,375

$3,375

0.0%

$54,751

$54,710

-0.1%

Genera

$11,306

$11,306

0.0%

$275,478

$214,893

-22.0%

n/a

$17,166

n/a

$247,954

$238,728

-3.7%

'Surgeons
OB-

GYNS

103. Medical Malpractice and Health Care Costs, Background Information
Prepared for the Health Care Transformation Task Force Dec. 3, 2007,
http://www.health.state.mn.us/divs/hpsc/hep/transform/dec03documents/med
icalmalpractice.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
104. Amy Lynn Sorrel, Liability Premium Outlook Improves as Many Physicians See
2009),
http://www.amaMed.
News
(Jan.
5,
Lower Rates, Am.
assn.org/amednews/2008/images/gprll 1229a.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
105. Id. The 2007 rate for OB3-GYNs was not available.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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Claim and Payment Rates

In addition to a steady medical liability market, Minnesota is
also low on the scale of paid-malpractice claims, with a total of
eighty-three claims in 2007.108 While not the lowest in the nation,
Minnesota falls in the bottom 50%.1' 9 Despite the relatively low
number of claims, the average dollar amount for paid claims in
Minnesota is higher than the national average: Minnesota's average
paid claim in 2007 was $367,537, compared to a national average of
$323,266.110 Minnesota's average rate is higher than that of thirtyseven other states."' Unlike many states, however, Minnesota does
or noneconomic damages in medical
not cap economic
• • 112
malpractice claims.
2.

Minnesota'sPioneeringWork in Disclosure of Adverse Events

In 1999, before the Adverse Health Care Events Law and even
before the seminal report of the Institute of Medicine, To Err is
Human, Children's Hospitals and Clinics of Minnesota (hereinafter
Children's) instituted a patient-safety program nationally
recognized for its innovation." 3 Part of its program was the
Statehealthfacts.org,
108.
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/profileind.jsp?cmp=1&cat=8&rgn=25&ind=
436&sub=102 (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
109.
Statehealthfacts.org,
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparemaptable.jsp?ind=436&cat=8&sub=
102&yr=18&typ=l&o=d&rgnhl=25&sort=1093 (last visited Mar. 30, 2009). The
state with the lowest number, Alaska, had just nine paid medical malpractice
claims in 2007. New York, on the other hand, ranked highest with 1,528 paid
claims. Id.
110. Statehealthfacts.org,
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparemaptable.jsp?ind=437&cat=8&sub=1
02&yr=18&typ=4&o=a&sort=698 (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
111. Id. Minnesota has adopted other tort reform measures which attempt to
decrease the number and costs of lawsuits. These include a requirement that a
plaintiff's attorney file an "affidavit of expert review" within 180 days of filing a
lawsuit; a "collateral source rule" that reduces a health care provider's liability by
the amount that the injured person receives from other sources such as workers
compensation; and proportional liability except in cases where one defendant is
found to be more than 50% responsible for the injury. Medical Malpractice and
Health Care Costs, supra note 103 (citing MINN. STAT. § 604.02).
112. United States General Accounting Office, Medical Malpractice Insurance:
Multiple Factors Contributed to Increased Premium Rates, GAO-03-702, at 61 (2003),
availableat http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d03702.pdf.
113. Children's Hospitals and Clinics of Minnesota, What We've Learned: Stories
available at
and Milestones from the Patient Safety Journey 4 (2006),
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adoption of a disclosure policy, under which Children's disclosed
to families whenever something had happened that either caused
harm or will potentially cause harm to their child. 14 Describing
this policy, Don Brunnquell, Ph. D., chair of the Children's Ethics
Committee said:
We disclose to families when there is anything significant
that affects a child's care, telling them what happened
and what we're doing to help their child. We also tell
families what we're doing to prevent something similar
from happening again. Families appreciate this openness.
They recognize that we value the importance of trust in a
care giving relationship.
Children's was an early adopter of this disclosure policy
among health care organizations. In 1999, Children's
board of directors recognized that telling families about a
medical accident was the right thing to do. This was
controversial at the time, because it countered the
traditional reluctance in health care to disclose this
15
information to families, for fear of malpractice lawsuits.
As a result of the policy, Children's reduced the number of
lawsuits by half in what one commentator described as a "high
116
liability exposure setting because of its young patients."
Shortly after the National Quality forum published its 2002
report titled Serious Reportable Events in Healthcare, recommending
that the occurrence of twenty-seven serious, largely preventable
events be reported by all licensed health care facilities, Minnesota
became the first state to pass an Adverse Health Events Reporting
Law. This law requires hospitals and ambulatory surgical centers to
report to the Minnesota Department of Health whenever one of
the twenty-seven, now twenty-eight, serious adverse health events
occur.

117

The events that must be reported parallel the list of so-

called "never events" determined by the National Quality Forum
and are grouped into six categories: surgical events, product or
device events, patient protection events, care management events,
Children's Hospital's
http://www.childrensmn.org/web/aboutus/072550.pdf.
pioneering work is widely mentioned by practitioners and scholars. See, e.g., Aaron
Lazare, Apology in Medical Practice:An Emerging ClinicalSkill, 296JAMA 1401 (2006).
114. Children's Hospitals and Clinics of Minnesota, supranote 113, at 9.
115. Id.
116. Barton and Kadzielski, supra note 70, at 57.
117. See Minnesota Hospital Association, Adverse Health Event Report Indicates
Care is More Transparent, Safer (Jan. 16, 2009), http://www.health.state.mn.us/
patientsafety/ae/09ahereport.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
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environmental events, and criminal events.' I8 While other states
subsequently adopted adverse event reporting laws, Minnesota's is
broader than most others in that it requires professional boards,
such as the Minnesota Medical Practice Board, to report events. It
also requires more information (including a root cause analysis and
corrective action plan) be reported than most other states."
Although the law only requires that adverse events be reported
to the state health department,120 a survey of providers taken five
years after the law's passage indicates that almost 90% of hospitals
reported adopting a policy of disclosing adverse events to patients
and family members.12 '
After evaluating the Department of
Health's five-year review of the law, the Minnesota Hospital
Association reported that "care is more transparent, safer" and that
"Minnesota continues to lead [the] nation in openness."'' 2 2 Both
the Hospital Association and the Department of Health attribute
promoting a safer culture to the law for improving systems and
behaviors.
The transparency affirmed by the Department of Health was
demonstrated last year in a well-publicized incident. On January
22, 2008, a newborn infant at Mercy Hospital in Coon Rapids,
Minnesota, suffered burn injuries after
a fire erupted in his bassinet
, -- 124
birth.
The bassinet included a
eleven hours after the infant's
radiant warmer and supplied pure oxygen to the infant to assist
with breathing. 125 The fire was quickly extinguished, and the infant
118.

MINN. STAT. §§ 144.7065(2)-(7) (2008).
119. Barton & Kadzielski, Tell Me Now and Tell Me Later, supra note 70, at 40-42.
The Minnesota law does not, however, require patient notification.
120. MINN. STAT. § 144.7065(1).
121. Minn. Dep't of Health, Adverse Health Care Events Reporting System: What
Have We Learned?, 5-YEAR REVIEW,
12
(Jan. 2009),
available at
http://www.health.state.mn.us/patientsafety/publications/09aheeval.pdf.
Sixty
percent of hospitals responding to the survey reported having a policy of
disclosing adverse events to patients and family members before enactment of the
reporting law; almost 90% reported having such a policy after the law.
122. Minnesota Hospital Association, Adverse Health Event Report Indicates Care is
More Transparent, Safer (Jan. 16, 2009), http://www.mnhospitals.org/index/newsmhaindex-action/story.2243?
archived=l (last visited Mar. 25, 2009).
123. See id.; see also Minn. Dept. of Health, supra note 121, at 2.
124. Allina Hospitals and Clinics, Mercy Hospital Fire Investigation Executive
Summary,
http://www.allina.com/ahs/news.nsf/page/Mercy-HospitalExecutive-Summary
_Final.pdf/$FILE/MercyHospitalExecutive SummaryFinal.pdf
(last visited
Mar. 25, 2009).
125. Id.

HeinOnline -- 35 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1437 2008-2009

1438

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:4

was transferred to Hennepin County Medical Center for treatment
days. 116
of the burns; the infant was discharged within a few
Responding quickly to the event, Allina issued a public statement
disclosing limited details of the incident and immediately began an
investigation.

121

IV. DISADVANTAGES AND DANGERS: THE PROBLEMS WITH
EXCLUSIONS

Arguments against the adoption of an evidentiary exclusion
for medical apologies fall largely into one of two categories. First,
some commentators familiar with the medical profession argued
that exclusions will not promote disclosure because doctors are
educated and acculturated in a way that makes them unlikely to
offer an apology following an adverse outcome regardless of
whether those apologies are excluded from evidence in later
malpractice actions. " 8 Second, some commentators focused on the
nature of apologies and contended that evidentiary exclusions rob
apologies of their moral content and, in so doing, undermine the
sincerity and, ultimately, the healing efficacy of apologies. " 9
A.

It Won't Work: Exclusions and the Nature of the Medical Profession

Promoting apology is the principal-if not only-reason to
consider adopting an exclusionary rule or statute barring evidence
of medical apologies at subsequent malpractice trials. It stands to
reason that if exclusion of apologies will not actually increase the
practice of medical apology, then a statutory exclusion has no
utility. There is good reason to be skeptical about the ability of an
exclusionary statute, or any evidentiary rule, to influence the
behavior of people in the real world who are not lawyers or judges.
The evidentiary rules, after all, are written and read by lawyers and
126. Id.
127. Allina Hospitals and Clinics, Statement about Incident Involving Infant at
Mercy
Hospital
(Jan.
23,
2008),
http://www.allina.com/ahs/
news.nsf/newspage/01_23 08_MercyHospitalIncidentStatement (last visited
Mar. 25, 2009).
128. See Daniel Eisenberg, When Doctors Say, "We're Sorry," TIME, Aug. 8, 2005,
at 50.
129. Brent T. White, Say You're Sony: Court-Ordered Apologies as a Civil Rights
Remedy, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 1261, 1294 (2006) (discussing generally that apologies
lose their moral dimension when they are protected under statutes that exclude
apologies from admission as evidence); see Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The
Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135 (2000).
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judges and meant, by and large, to guide the behavior of lawyers
and judges in the courtroom. There is something presumptuous
about believing that a change in evidentiary rules can influence the
behavior of anyone acting outside the confines of the justice
system. In moments of doubt or crisis, people do not turn to the
rules of evidence for wisdom.
That being said, there are at least a few evidentiary rules which
are meant to guide, or at least not discourage, the behavior of realworld actors. Chief among these is Rule 407, which excludes
evidence of repair made or remedial actions taken following an
accident, if offered to prove fault. 1' As the Advisory Committee
notes to Rule 407 explain, the fundamental "ground for exclusion
rests on a social policy of encouraging people to take, or at least
not discouraging them from taking, steps in furtherance of added
safety." 3: However, this ground for the rule seems shaky, at best.
As one treatise provides:
What seems the most important rationale (encouraging
subsequent repairs) is open to considerable doubt. Most
ordinary citizens are unaware of FRE 407 and do not
consult a lawyer in deciding whether to undertake repairs.
And it is doubtful that large manufacturers, even if welladvised and familiar with litigation, need the incentive of
FRE 407 to make their products safer. They are likely to
do so regardless of evidentiary consequences in order to
prevent further injuries and lawsuits and avoid the
possibility that inaction in the face of repeated accidents
or injuries will itself be taken as proof of negligence,
or
v
32
even as the basis of the award of punitive damages.
Hospitals are invariably well-advised and familiar with
litigation, and an adverse medical outcome is, of course, the sort of
event that triggers the realization that it may be time to call a

130. FED. R. EVID. 407, identical to its Minnesota counterpart, provides:
When, after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an event, measures are
taken which, if taken previously, would have made the event less likely to
occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove
negligence, culpable conduct, a defect in a product, a defect in a
product's design, or a need for a warning or instruction. This rule does
not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when
offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or
feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.
131.
FED. R. EVID. 702, advisory committee notes (1972).
132. CHRISTOPHER MUELLER & LAIRD KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 4.23 (2d ed.
1999).
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lawyer. Nonetheless, there is good reason to believe that, like
ordinary citizens and large manufacturers, doctors and hospitals
are unlikely to first look to evidentiary rules as a guide for their
behavior in the real world.
Indeed, one recent commentator contends that doctors are
particularly unlikely to be influenced by changes in the
admissibility of medical apologies. In Doctors, Apologies, and the Law:
An Analysis and Critique of Apology Laws, Marlynn Wei (now Dr.
Marlynn Wei) argues at length that there are deep, systemic
reasons that doctors are reluctant to disclose or apologize following
an adverse outcome.13 To be sure, some of this reluctance is
rooted in a distrust of the legal system:
The AMA Code of Ethics clearly forbids physicians from
considering legal liability during disclosure, but fear of
malpractice litigation is pervasive and potent. Physicians
see the tort system as an irrational "lawsuit lottery" and
"revile malpractice claims as random events that visit
unwarranted expense and emotional pain on competent,
hardworking practitioners." But physicians overestimate
the certainty and severity of legal sanctions, and the actual
risk of getting sued by threefold. Studies suggest that
physicians believe erroneously that most negligent adverse
events lead to lawsuits, estimating that sixty percent of
cases involving negligence result in litigation, which is
thirty times higher than most estimates.134
But a doctor's reluctance to apologize goes beyond mistrust of
the legal system, Wei argues. It is the more fundamental failure to
disclose an error.
Wei traces the deeper roots of the reluctance to disclose, citing
in medicine; 135 the expectation of
desire for self-regulation
136
.
a concern that admission of error will result
physician perfection;
13713
in a loss of trust; guilt and shame; 13 a belief that it is the role of
the physician to heal, not deliver bad news;13 9 and an asymmetry in
the physician-patient relationship that enables the doctor to keep
silent, "particularly when there is no obvious harm done."'
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

40J. HEALTH L. 107 (2007).
Id. at 137-38 (citations omitted).
Id. at 146.
Id. at 147.
Id. at 149.
Id. at 151.
Id. at 152.
Id. at 153.
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Essentially, Wei addresses the problems discussed in The Silent World
of Doctor and Patientwith which we began this article. From Wei's
perspective, little changed-despite the calls for disclosure of
medical errors-since 1984. As Wei summarizes the situation:
[These] deeply ingrained traditions in medicine have
made the discussion of medical errors uncomfortable or
foreign to physicians. Apology laws do nothing to change
these norms and habits. As long as they are present,
physicians will continue to remain as silent as before. 141
As support for her conclusion, Wei points to studies detailing
failure of many physicians to disclose.142 Assuming the continued
efficacy of these studies (one may hope that time, education, and
ethical guidance post-To Err is Human will have an impact not
seen in early studies) is not a compelling reason on its own to
oppose changing the evidentiary status of medical apologies.
Instead, for those who favor increasing the incidence of apology
and disclosure following an adverse medical outcome, once the
evidentiary exclusion is in place, should turn their attention to
reform of medical education and culture.
In the end, the
argument that other factors also make doctors reluctant to
apologize is not an objection to evidentiary exclusion for medical
apologies; it is an argument that changing the evidentiary status is
just a one step in solving this problem.
B.

It's Immoral: Exclusions and the Nature of Apologies

The second objection to excluding medical apologies from
evidence is more subtle and more troubling. This objection looks
to the nature of apologies and concludes that there is something
about evidentiary exclusions that would taint an apology. Lee Taft
wrote persuasively-and frequently-about the ethical context of
medical apologies. 14 Taft draws a sharp line between what he
terms "authentic apologies" and other statements that express
remorse, regret, sympathy, or empathy, but stop short of
acknowledging fault. Similarly, writing about medical apologies,
141. Id. at 155 (citation omitted).
142. Id. at 124-46.
143. See, e.g., Lee Taft, On Bended Knee (With Fingers Crossed), 55 DEPAUL L. REV.
601, 603-04 (2006); Lee Taft, Apology and Medical Mistake: Opportunity or Foil?, 14
ANNALS OF HEALTH LAw 55, 59 (Winter 2005) [hereinafter Apology and Medical
Mistake]; Lee Taft, Apology Within a Moral Dialectic: A Reply to Professor Robbennolt,
103 MICH. L. REv. 1010, 1010-11 (2005); Taft, supra note 129, at 1138.
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Dr. Aaron Lazare stated, "[a]n apology, in its simplest terms, is an
acknowledgement of responsibility for an offense coupled with an
expression of remorse. ,P Both components are essential for a
statement to qualify as an apology. "The expression 'I am sorry,' by5
itself, is an expression of regret or compassion, not an apology.''
Drawing from some of Dr. Lazare's earlier work, Taft terms an
expression of remorse that does
not include an acknowledgement
146
of fault a "botched apology."'

As seen, the distinction between an expression of remorse and
an acknowledgement of fault is critical to the two different general
approaches taken in state statutes establishing exclusions for
medical apologies. The Texas-California approach creates an
exclusion for expressions of remorse, but does not protect
statements concerning negligence or culpable conduct. On the
other hand, the Colorado statute excludes any statement made by a
health care provider (or the employee of a health care provider),
including those that express fault. Though this is an important
distinction between the two statutory approaches, Taft's objection
extends to both types of statutes.
In situations involving serious injury resulting from
unexpected medical outcomes, Taft is critical of the statutory
approach adopted in Texas and California:
I oppose these kinds of protected apologies, at least in the
context of serious and meaningful injury. Their sponsors
fail to see the wisdom of the evidentiary rule. The rule
makes the expression of apology much more difficult
because it takes great courage to accept responsibility in
the face of great loss. For some, the rule may totally
interrupt the moral inclination to confess. Yet it is
precisely because the rule demands so much that it must
ultimately be seen as a safeguard of the moral integrity of
authentic apology. 147
For Taft, protection for these types of "botched apologies" is a
144. Aaron Lazare, The Healing Forces of Apology in Medical Practice and Beyond,
57 DEPAUL L. REv. 251, 255 (2008).
145. Id. at 256.
146. Apology and Medical Mistake, supra note 143, at 55, 72, n.119 (citing to
Aaron Lazare, Go Ahead and Say You're Sony, PSYCH. TODAY 40 (Jan.-Feb. 1995)).
Robbennolt uses the term "partial apology" for a statement of remorse that does
not touch on fault. See, e.g.,
Jennifer Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: An
EmpiricalExamination, 102 MICH. L. REv. 460, 498 (2003). Unlike Taft, however,
Robbennolt argues that half an apology is better than none.
147. Apology and MedicalMistake, supra note 143, at 79.
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cure worse than the disease. 14 Encouraging this type of statement
is also a mistake because, citing Lazare, botched apologies can "fuel
the anger the gesture was
rather than. assuage
bitter vengeance
,,149
• •
strategically designed to alleviate.
If the Texas-California approach to medical apologies is bad,
the Colorado approach is, for Taft, even worse. Taft conjures the
specter of a doctor offering an apology replete with an explanation
of the medical
150 mishap, an admission of fault, and a promise of
When the promise is not kept, the Colorado
recompense.
doctor, cloaked in immunity, can recant the explanation and deny
fault. Taft argues that no good can come from this situation.15
To a great extent, Taft's objections are correct. No doubt,
exclusionary protections for medical apologies do have an adverse
impact on the ethical and moral caliber of apologies. Taft's
arguments are flawed in two respects, however. First, barring
courtroom use of an apology may reduce the quanta of "moral
courage" necessary to make an apology, but that does not mean
that the apology is so cheapened it is cost-free. Even if courtroom
use is no longer possible, a medical apology still carries legal costs.
Returning to Taft's Colorado example, the doctor making the
apology alerted the potential plaintiffs to the nature of the medical
error and must certainly realize that if the promise to compensate
is not kept, the apology not only made a lawsuit more likely, it gave
would-be plaintiffs a leg up in finding a lawyer and proving their
case. In addition, a host of considerations beyond legal liability
may prevent those lacking sufficient "moral courage" from making
an apology. After an adverse outcome, a doctor may find making
an authentic apology difficult or even impossible because of a
range of factors, such as shame, damage to professional reputation
or self-esteem, fear of betraying the trust of others involved in the
procedure, or simple personal discomfort.152 As Wei argues, there
are strong currents in medical culture that make apology difficult

148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 81.
151. Id.
Lazare, supra note 144, at 265 (stating that "[m]edical
152. See, e.g.,
professionals fear that admission of fault and apology will be perceived as signs of
weakness and expose them to humiliation and punishment, such as malpractice
suits and formal complaints to hospital administration and the Board of
Registration").
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for doctors even if concerns of legal liability can be alleviated. 15' A
doctor who swims against those currents will need a measure of
moral courage.
Yes, for some, evidentiary exclusion may
undermine the ethical content of an apology, but it does not vitiate
the ethical content altogether.
The second objection to Taft's argument is more significant.
It may well be true that we would all be better off if we lived in a
world where men and women of moral courage communicated
with each other honestly, fearlessly, and compassionately. We do
not. 154
In situations of conflict and risk, there is a wide
constellation of motivations for any person's statements. The law is
not particularly adept at identifying which star in that constellation
twinkles most brightly. It may well be true that exclusionary
statutes degrade the moral content of apologies. It is also true,
however, that refusing to adopt exclusionary statutes cannot insure
the moral integrity of apologies.
Here, in a nutshell, is the problem. As set forth above, doctors
and hospitals are learning that open communication with patients
and patients' families following adverse outcomes is beneficial.
One of the reasons apologies may be beneficial is that they seem to
reduce the likelihood of later medical malpractice lawsuits. There
is nothing wrong with doctors and hospitals taking note of this, but
it does mean that from here on in, all medical apologies will be
made in a realm of moral ambiguity. We will not know whether an
apology is an authentic expression of sorrow meant to facilitate
healing or a well-crafted statement15 5meant to minimize the
likelihood of future litigation--or both.
The point here is not that Taft's objections have no merit.
The point, instead, is that those objections do not provide a solid
basis for rejecting exclusionary protections for medical apologies.
The basis for rejecting statutory protections for medical apologies is
best found, not in the nature of the medical profession or the
moral nature of apologies, but in the nature of lawyers and legal
advice.

153. See Wei, supra note 20, at 121-36.
154. See, e.g., this morning's paper or this evening's nightly news.
155.
For an example of an amoral, or perhaps immoral, apology see Apology
and Medical Mistake, supra note 143, at 80-81.
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Here's My Advice: The Nature of Lawyers

Statutes and rules are the stuff of law, and the creation of a
new statute or a new rule will inevitably mean the creation of new
work for lawyers. The creation of an evidentiary exclusion for
medical apologies is no exception to this axiom. As illustrated
above, the different state statutes governing medical apologies may
fall into two general categories, but the variations among the
statutes within each of those categories are numerous and subtle.
As such, the protections and contours of each of these statutory
safe harbors are slightly different, and ought not be navigated
without the assistance of a knowledgeable pilot. Were Minnesota to
adopt an evidentiary exclusion for medical apologies, the task of
interpreting that exclusion would fall to Minnesota lawyers. While
thoughtful and experienced health care professionals would no
doubt play a role in the implementation of the exclusion, the
expertise about the exclusion would be the province of lawyers. It
is lawyers who would be called upon to opine which statements
qualified for the protections of the exclusion and which did not.
Consider again the text of the Colorado exclusion:
(1) In any civil action brought by an alleged victim of an
unanticipated outcome of medical care, or in any
arbitration proceeding related to such civil action, any
and all statements, affirmations, gestures, or conduct
expressing apology, fault, sympathy, commiseration,
condolence, compassion, or a general sense of
benevolence which are made by a health care provider or
an employee of a health care provider to the alleged
victim, a relative of the alleged victim, or a representative
of the alleged victim and which relate to the discomfort,
pain, suffering, injury, or death of the alleged victim as
the result of the unanticipated outcome of medical care
shall be inadmissible as evidence of an admission of
liability or as evidence of an admission against interest.
(2) For purposes of this section, unless the context
otherwise requires:
(a) "Health care provider" means any person
licensed or certified by the state of Colorado to
deliver health care and any clinic, health dispensary,
or health facility licensed by the state of Colorado.
The term includes any professional corporation or
other professional entity comprised of such health
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care providers as permitted by the laws of this state.
(b) "Relative" means a victim's spouse, parent,
grandparent,
stepfather,
stepmother,
child,
grandchild, brother, sister, half brother, half sister, or
spouse's
parents.
The
term includes
said
relationships that are created as a result of adoption.
In addition, "relative" includes any person who has a
family-type
relationship
with
a
victim.
(c) "Representative" means a legal guardian,
attorney, person designated to make decisions on
behalf of a patient under a medical power of
attorney, or any person recognized in law or custom
as
a
patient's
agent.
(d) "Unanticipated outcome" means the outcome of
a medical treatment or procedure that differs from
an

expected

result. 156

Though the Colorado statute provides broad protection for
medical apologies, that protection is not unlimited. The language
of the statute raises several questions that call for legal
interpretation, such as:
* What constitutes a gesture expressing fault?
* Subpart (1) of the statute indicates that a
statement is inadmissible if it expresses, for
example, fault and also relates to "the discomfort,
pain, suffering, injury, or death of the alleged
victim." Is a statement inadmissible if it does not
relate to the victim's discomfort, pain, suffering,
injury, or death?
• With respect to subpart (2), when might the
"context otherwise require"?
* Are statements made to other health care
professionals rendered inadmissible, if it could
have been reasonably anticipated that the
statements would be overheard by family
members?
• Conversely, are statements made to family
members rendered admissible by virtue of the fact
156.

COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-135 (2005).
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that others outside the family are present when
they are made?
* Is a life partner who is not a spouse a "person who
has a family-type relationship" with a victim?
* Is
every
adverse
medical
outcome
an
"unanticipated outcome"?
This is not meant to fault the drafting of the Colorado statute. This
is the nature of statutes. This is why we have lawyers.
To be sure, Colorado hospital administrators and health care
risk managers and doctors will all acquire some measure of
experience with the Colorado law and that experience will no
doubt be important in considering the parameters of the statute.
Inevitably, however, it will be lawyers who acquire and wield
expertise in interpretation of the Colorado law. It will be lawyers
who decide how the experience of health care professionals bears
on questions of statutory interpretation. It will be lawyers who must
render opinions on whether particular statements qualify for the
protection of the statute. As it is in Colorado, so must it be in every
other state in which legally created safe harbors protect some
statements and, perforce, not others. Once a statute or evidentiary
rule is in place, communication between doctors and patients will
inevitably be triangulated through lawyers.
Defining the boundaries of medical apologies legally creates at
least three types of problems for effective communication between
doctors and patients or their families. First, lawyers will become
involved in the apology process earlier. At present, a medical
apology is excluded from evidence at trial, but only when that
apology is made in the course of "compromise negotiations"
concerning "a claim which was disputed as to either validity or
amount. "
Apologies made during settlement negotiations, after
a lawsuit has begun and lawyers have been hired, will, in most
instances, be excluded by Rule 408. 15 As a matter of course,
157. MINN. R. EVD. 408. In addition, Rule 409 excludes offers to pay "medical,
hospital, or similar expenses occasioned by an injury," if that evidence is offered as
proof of liability.
158. On the other hand, even offers to settle in exchange for a release of
claims may be admissible if the offer was made prior to any dispute. See, e.g., C.J.
Duffey Paper Co. v. Reger, 588 N.W.2d 519, 524-25 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999). In
Greenstreet v. Brown, Greenstreet learned that thejudgment in his divorce had been
amended. 623 A.2d 1270, 1272 (Me. 1993). When he called Brown, his lawyer, to
ask about the amended judgment, Brown told Greenstreet he had made a mistake
in not opposing the motion to amend and "that he would pay Greenstreet money
to make amends for his conduct." Id. On appeal from the judgment in the
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lawyers will be involved in settlement negotiations and might well
counsel health care clients about the utility and appropriateness of
making an apology. By the time this occurs, however, all the
parties are in the middle of a lawsuit. A medical apology exclusion,
be it broad or narrow, creates a role for lawyers in the process of
apology well before any lawsuit is filed or, perhaps, even
contemplated.
This will interfere with doctor-patient communication by
causing delay. Effective apologies, experts tell us, are those which
are made as quickly as possible after the event or realizing the
error-within twenty-four hours according to the Joint
Commission's book, DisclosingMedical Errors:A Guide to An Effective
Explanation and Apology. 159 Yet the rationale espoused for medical
apology exclusions is that medical personnel will be more likely to
apologize if they are assured that their statements cannot be used
in a later malpractice trial. If the logic of that rationale is correct, if
it is the assurance of exclusion that promotes apology, then that
Health care
assurance will have to come from lawyers.
professionals will have a strong incentive to communicate with
counsel before making any statement they hope will qualify for the
protection of the exclusion. And while some lawyers embrace the
disclosure and apology movement'6° others are reluctant to advise
clients to apologize, concerned that disclosure will provoke
litigation and "make a bad situation worse."' 16' And at a time when
ensuing malpractice action, Brown argued that Rule 408 should have excluded his
statements on the telephone. Id. The Maine Supreme Court disagreed. Noting
that "Brown's statement informed Greenstreet for the first time about facts that
might give rise to a claim" the court held there was no evidence that a dispute
existed about the validity of a claim or the amount claimed at the time of Brown's
admission. Id. (emphasis added).
159. Joint Commission, Disclosing Medical Errors: A Guide to An Effective
Explanation and Apology (Joint Commission Resources 2006). See also Lucian
Leape, Disclose, Apologize, Explain, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 16, 2006, at 50 (outlining four

steps: disclose; take responsibility; apologize at once; explain what will be done
differently in the future) (emphasis added).
160. See AHLA's GUIDE TO HEALTHCARE LEGAL FORMS, AGREEMENTS AND
PoucIEs (AHLA 2008). For two excellent pieces describing the need for attorneys
to encourage full disclosure to patients see, e.g., Charity Scott, Doctors as Advocates,
Lawyers as Healers, 29 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 331, 372 (2008); Winslade &
McKinney, The Ethical Health Lawyer: To Tell or Not to Tell. Disclosing Medical Error,
34J.L. MED. & ETHIcS 478, 482 (2006). We doubt that these scholars saw a need to
write these recent articles, however, if there was widespread acceptance of the
disclosure/apology movement by lawyers.
161. Lola Butcher, Lawyers Say 'Sony' May Sink You in Court, THE PHYSICIAN
ExEcuTIvE (Mar/April 2006) at p. 20-23. See, e.g., Kevin Quinley, 'Sory Works'-or
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responsiveness to the patient is at a premium, even the perfectly
responsive lawyer remains always at least a phone call away.
A second and more significant problem is that inviting the
lawyer to analyze the apology means that the apology itself will be
parsed and revised by the lawyer. Consider some of the following
advice:
[1]n apologizing, it is essential to shun unnecessarily
incriminating expressions such as "I regret that we didn't
anticipate.. ." or "I wish that we had done. ..

."

Also in

the category of risky disclosures are "My weekend coverage
didn't know that you had been taking blah, blah.

.

." or

"My nurse didn't understandthat you had been told.... .1 62
This advice is consistent with a "tip sheet" from an insurer of
eighteen thousand health care providers which cautions against
uttering the words "error," "mistake,"
"fault" or "negligence" while
16
discussing unanticipated outcomes. 1
This may be sound legal advice.
But when proposed
statements of apology are ghost written by lawyers some of the
attributes of apologies most valued will be lost.
The beneficial
effects of apologies, whether framed in terms of fostering healing
or avoiding litigation, stem from the openness of communication

Does It?, 25 MED. MALPRACTICE L & STRATEGY 3 (Dec. 2007) (warning practitioners
of the insurance coverage perils lurking in "so-called apology programs");
Marthadra J. Beckworth, Admissibility of Statements of Condolence or Apology,
PHYSICIANS LIABILITY INS. COMPANY (Oklahoma State Med. Ass., Oklahoma City,
OX), Fourth Quarter, 2006 (noting that there "is a fine line between an
expression of condolence and an admission" and that this fact should "give one
pause before meeting with the patient or the family to offer condolences"),
available
at
http://www.plico-ok.com/sites/plico/uploads/images/4Q06%
20newsletter.pdf.
162. Alvin L. Block, Disclosure of Adverse Outcome and Apologizing to the Injured
Patient,in FUNDAMENTALS OF HEALTH LAW 279.
163. Ray Henry, More States Weigh 'Apology' Optionsfor Doctors Leery of Lawsuits,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 12, 2007.

164. As Robin Ebert writes, "with the increasing presence of "I'm sorry" laws,
some practitioners and activist groups started to develop strategies on how to
communicate an effective apology." Robin E. Ebert, Attorneys, Tell Your Clients To
Say They're Sony: Apologies in the Health CareIndustry, 5 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 337, 363
(2008). "The problem with these strategies and guidelines is that they may begin
to depreciate the true value of the apology." Id. "A scripted apology may
engender more anger on behalf of the injured party than had there been no
communication between the two parties at all." Id. For examples of suggested
"apology" language written by lawyers, see Marshall H. Tanick and Teresa Ayling,
Alternative Dispute Resolution by Apology: Settlement by Saying "I'm Sony," THE
HENNEPIN LAWYER, July-Aug. 1996, at 22-25.
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between doctor and patient. 165 Triangulating a doctor's
communication with a patient through a lawyer will result in a loss
of openness. Rather than a physician focused on the patient, the
physician will be trying to remember the words the attorney
crafted.
Communication will become less direct and more
guarded.
There is no better example of the phenomena of legalization
of physician-patient communication than medicine's experience
with informed consent. As Carol E. Schneider concludes in After
Autonomy, the evidence that doctors fully inform patients is
disheartening and even where serious efforts are made to explain,
the level of patient comprehension of that information is
dismaying. 166 Yet informed consent written documents drafted by
lawyers and signed by patients proliferate. Nurses refer to these
documents (not the conversation between physician and patient)
as "the permit." Rather than patients knowingly consenting to a
procedure, they are "consented." As Ellen Meisel and Mark
Kuczewxai write, "[a]s practiced, and certainly as symbolized by
consent forms, informed consent is often no more than a medical
Miranda warning. ' '
Acknowledgement of this, in part, led to increased emphasis
on improving physician-patient communication. The Federation of
State Medical Boards, for example, put a clinical and
communication skills assessment in place as a requirement of
physician licensure in 2004.' 6' It proposes that physicians seeking
re-licensure demonstrate competence in communication skills.'o

165. See supranote 113 and accompanying text.
166. Carl E. Schneider, After Autonomy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 411, 417-18
(2006). Schneider relies, in part, on the Herz study of 106 patients facing routine
neurosurgical procedures. The authors wrote of their study, "consideration must
be given to the concept that fulfillment of the doctrine of informed consent...
may very well be mythical." David A. Herz et al, Informed Consent: Is It a Myth ?, 30
NEUROSURGERY 453 (1992) (suggesting that where prudent neurosurgeons
making a concerted effort at patient education, one still cannot expect patient
understanding or comprehension).
167. Ellen Meisel & Mark Kuczewxai, Legal and Ethics Myths without Informed
Consent, 156 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MEDICINE 2,521, 2,522 (1996). This is echoed by
Jay Katz when he wrote "[il nformed consent in today's world, is largely a charade
which misleads patients into thinking that they are making decisions when indeed
they are not." Katz, supranote 18, at 84.
168. Joint Commission, Health Care at the Crossroads,supranote 65, at 18.
169. FED'N OF STATE MED. BOARDS, SPECIAL COMM. ON MAINT. OF LICENSURE,
DRAFT REPORT 12 (2007). For a discussion of the recent initiatives that call for
communication skills training, see Bobbi McAdoo, Physicians: Listen Up and Take
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Medical schools now teach communication skills, but the resistance
by many physicians17 ° to these efforts is a telling sign of the need
they address: improved communication between doctor and
patient.
Finally, creation of an evidentiary exclusion for medical
apologies will result in apologies conforming to the contours of the
exclusion. Simply put, once there is a safe harbor, all boats will
moor there.
Predictably and appropriately, health care
professionals will seek advice from their lawyer about whether a
particular planned statement will be protected by the exclusion.
Predictably and appropriately, the lawyer will proffer advice and
amendment so that the planned statement will enjoy that
protection. Predictably and appropriately, that advice will err on
the side of caution. And at that moment, the health care
professionals face a decision: do we use the apology the lawyer
approved or do we ignore the legal advice we received and permit
the doctor to offer a statement that goes further? Predictably and
appropriately, health care professionals will heed their lawyer's
advice. Apologies will inevitably and understandably be shaped so
that they will be protected by the exclusion.
Once again, something will be lost. Apologies will be tailored
and truncated so they fit the exclusion. Immediacy and openness
will be sacrificed for the protection of the exclusion. And that loss
is significant, because the virtue and efficacy of apologies are
largely rooted in those two attributes. In the absence of a medical
apology exclusion, some hospitals and doctors may make decisions
about patient communication based on professional considerations
of candor and the welfare of patients and their families. Other
hospitals and doctors may make these decisions based on
assessments about risk management and lawsuit-avoidance. Either
provides more appropriate and rational guidance for doctorpatient communication than the language of an evidentiary
exclusion.
V.

CONCLUSION

Minnesota finds itself in the fortunate position of having

Your Communication Skills Training Seriously, 29

HAMLINE

J.

PUB.

L. & POL'Y 287

(2008).
170. See, e.g., Joint Commission, Health Care at the Crossroads, supra note 65, at
18 (describing a "firestorm of resistance" to the communication skills assessment).
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relatively low medical malpractice rates and also being at the
forefront of the movement to foster fuller disclosure after an
adverse medical event. Minnesota also stands among the fifteen or
so states without a statute or evidentiary rule excluding the use of
medical apologies at trial. There is, admittedly, no scientific proof
that there is a causal relationship among these three phenomena.
There is, however, good reason to believe that adopting an
exclusion for medical apologies will give lawyers a new and more
significant role in crafting the communication between doctors and
patients following an adverse medical event. And, as we argued,
there is good reason to believe that in the diligent exercise of that
role, lawyers may impinge on the openness of that communication
and, as a consequence, on its efficacy.
In the end, states that hope to improve the communication
between doctors and their patients should turn their attention to
changing medical culture rather than evidentiary rules. It is, no
doubt, easier to draft evidentiary rules, but Minnesota's experience
demonstrates that more profound change will come from focusing
on what happens in hospitals rather than what happens in
courtrooms.
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